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Public Health View of Gambling Disorder
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Possible Consequences of Internet
Gambling Regulations


Decrease gambling-related problems
 Increase gambling-related problems
 Have no effect on gambling-related problems
 Influence gambling-related problems indirectly
through other factors
– e.g., communicating danger vs. safety

Bernhard & Preston, 2004

Potential Consequences of
Harm Reduction Techniques


Self-limits
– Help gamblers regulate, but
not stop, their gambling
behavior?



Corporate Deposit
Limits
– Potential safeguard against
spending too much money
gambling ?



Responsible Gambling
“flags”
– Use customer service
communications to identify
subscribers who have
gambling problems?
– Deliver effective interventions
when appropriate?

Self-limitation of Deposits


Default limit on deposits
– €1000/day
– €5000/30 day period



bwin.party allows subscribers to reduce
their deposit limits
 Attempts to exceed self-imposed deposit
limits are blocked by the company software
system
Nelson, LaPlante, Peller, Schumann, LaBrie, & Shaffer, 2008

Expectations


Users who make use of the self-limit
feature will constitute a group of extremely
engaged gamblers
 Self-limitation will promote reduced
gambling behavior
– Decreased stakes, fewer bets, less frequent
betting

Sample Description


Of bwin.party subscribers who subscribed
during February 2005 (N ~ 47,000)…
 567 (1.2%) of the sample self-limited their
maximum deposit amounts (Limiters)
– 7% placed these limits before they made their
first bet
– 11% ceased betting completely after they
self-imposed limits

Limiters vs. Non-Limiters


Before imposing limits, Limiters
– Played more types of games (2.5 vs. 2.1)
– Played more frequently (days/duration)
 Fixed odds: 33% vs. 27% of days

– Place more bets per betting day
 Fixed odds: 5 vs. 4 bets per betting day

– Wagered less per bet
 Fixed odds: €6.15 vs. €11.46

– Did not differ on percent lost, net loss, or
amount wagered
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Summary


Before placing limits, Limiters were more active
bettors than others
– Played more types of games, higher frequency of
betting days, placed more bets per day BUT wagered
less per bet



Multi-dimensional view of gambling involvement
– Frequency of betting vs. expenditure



Self-limitation mainly reduced time spent
gambling
– Wagered less over time, but driven by fewer bets

Potential Consequences of
Harm Reduction Techniques


Self-limits
– Reduced frequency of betting
– Not used by many
subscribers
– Not used for self-exclusion



Corporate Deposit
Limits



Responsible Gambling
“flags”

Deposit Limits


Corporate deposit limits
– €1000/day
– €5000/30 day period



When subscribers try to deposit more,
bwin.party:
– Sent email notification
– Rejected the attempted deposit

Broda, LaPlante, Nelson, LaBrie, Bosworth, & Shaffer, 2008

Expectations


Subscribers who receive a notification will
constitute a group of extremely engaged
gamblers
– Money spent, time spent, both?



Receiving a notification acts as a warning
sign
– Gambling behavior would attenuate after such
notification

Sample Description


Of bwin.party subscribers who subscribed
during February 2005 (N ~ 47,000)…
 Most did not come close to exceeding corporate
limits
– Mean deposited per 24 hours = €111


160 (0.3%) of the sample received at least one
notification about exceeding deposit limits
(Exceeders)
– 3.1% stopped depositing money after receiving the
notification

Exceeders vs. Non-Exceeders


Across 2 years of activity, compared to nonExceeders, Exceeders
– Bet with similar frequency (betting days/duration)
– Placed more bets per betting day
 Fixed odds: 7 vs. 4 bets per betting day

– Wagered more per bet
– Lost a smaller proportion of what they wagered
– Lost more overall
 Fixed odds: €1135 vs. €185

– More likely to engage in live-action sportsbetting

Gambling Behavior
Before & After Notification


After receiving notification, Exceeders:
– Did not reduce their number of active betting
days
– Decreased the average number of bets per
active betting day
– Increased their average size of bet

Exceeders made fewer, larger bets per
active betting day after notification

Summary


Exceeding established limits can serve as an
indicator of excessive betting behavior
– More bets per day, bigger wagers, greater losses
overall



Notification systems do not completely curtail
betting behavior, but are associated with
changes in betting strategy
– Fewer, bigger bets

Potential Consequences of
Harm Reduction Techniques


Self-limits
– Help gamblers reduce
gambling involvement
– Not used by many
subscribers
– Not used for self-exclusion



Corporate Deposit
Limits
– Affects a minority
– Healthier gambling patterns?
– Mere existence might serve
as a harm reduction device



Responsible Gambling
“flags”

Expectations


bwin.party has an internal system for identifying
subscribers on the basis of communications with
customer service



Subscribers who trigger responsible gambling
“flags” might show excessive gambling behavior
compared to those who have similar exposure
but do not trigger such flags

Gray, LaPlante & Shaffer, 2012

Sample


Subscribers who experienced at least one
responsible gambling event (RG cases)
– n = 2,066



Subscribers who made an initial bwin.party
deposit on the same day as a case, but did not
experience a responsible gambling event
(Controls)
– n = 2,066

 Betting transaction data covered August, 2000

to November, 2010

Events & Responses
Description

Proportion within
Most common
RG cases
bwin.party response
The subscriber asks to have account
45.1%
Account is reopened
closed due to problem gambling OR
OR account remains
reopened after a closure
closed
The subscriber reports a problem (e.g.,
16.2%
Account blocked/closed
technology, payment issue) and email
OR bwin.party gives RG
correspondence suggests gambling
advice
problems
The subscriber requests to change the
14.9%
Deposit limit changed
personal deposit limit
The subscriber wants product(s)
blocked due to problem gambling

13.3%

Account is partially
blocked
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Classification Table

Actual group
membership

Predicted group membership
Control

Control

83.7%

Responsible gambling
case
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Correctly classified 78.7% of subscribers
Wilks’s lambda = 0.63, Χ2(27) = 188.98, p < .001
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Summary


Discriminant function correctly classified 79%
of subscribers
– Live action patterns particularly revealing

Subscribers “flagged” by Customer Service
gambled more intensely than subscribers not
flagged
 Change in gambling behavior after RG
event/response… ?


Transparency Project

Potential Consequences of
Harm Reduction Techniques


Self-limits
– Help gamblers reduce
gambling involvement
– Not used by many
subscribers
– Not used for self-exclusion



Corporate Deposit
Limits
– Affects a minority
– Healthier gambling patterns?
– Mere existence might serve
as a harm reduction device



Responsible Gambling
“flags”
– Consumer service
interactions can provide a
basis for identifying
subscribers with potentially
unhealthy gambling patterns
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Take Home Messages


Possible and scientifically advantageous to
study actual gambling behavior
 Initial evidence of the effectiveness of harm
reduction strategies
– Could be selection effect


Many additional questions
– Interventions for people with more severe problems
– Effects of interventions on players who are not
having problems (reasonable burdens?)
– Economic costs associated with harm reduction
strategies
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